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1
IS LAW THE PRESCRIPTION THAT CAN CURE MEDICINE?

SAMUEL GOROVITZ2

It is a pleasure and a privilege to have this opportunity for endless learning
in an environment so rich and so different from my own. I am grateful to Mr.
Drinko, to the firm he represents, to Dean Steinglass, and to the faculty of the
Cleveland-Marshall College of Law for the honor of being the first non-lawyer
to occupy this chair. Not only am I not a lawyer, it is even worse. My training
is as a philosopher.
When asked to pick a topic, I first considered two that I had independent
reasons to be working on. One was the Food and Drug Administration's
regulation of tobacco, a subject I was to address in November. The other was
physician assisted suicide, an issue on which I have been working for the New
York State Task Force on Life and the Law. I tried to decide between these two
issues, and then realized that I ought to address what they have in common.
They both raise the question of the role of law in health-related decision
making. Thus, I titled this lecture, "Is Law the Prescription that Can Cure
Medicine?"
Why even ask such a question? What ails medicine that I should suggest that
it is in need of a cure? To answer that question, I have to make a brief historical
comment about the development of health care capacities.
Medicine as a human social enterprise is old. It has probably gone on in one
form or another for tens of thousands of years. For most of its history, until
extremely recently, medical intervention had no significant capacity to achieve
its objectives. It is only very recently, primarily in our time-or if one wants to
take the long view, since the 19th century, which is just a couple of minutes ago
in terms of the development of human history and human social
institutions-that medical intervention has had the capacity to achieve a
significant proportion of its objectives.
Physicians used to attend to the ailing and the dying with a repertoire of
interventions which, viewed in retrospect, we understand ranged primarily
from the innocuous to the lethal. Some have claimed, with considerable
credibility, that only in our time has medicine on balance done more good than
harm. A few even argue that it has not quite gotten there yet. Most acknowledge
that in times past some medical interventions did help but that much of that
help was simply the effectiveness of a caring presence, of the physiological
consequences for the patient of trusting in a figure presumed to have powers
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and authority. Here and there the odd herbal remedy had an active ingredient,
some of which we are now identifying. Set against that was all the leeching,
bleeding, and administration of toxic substances. It was all relatively simple.
Now medical care has been transformed. We recognize that the human
organism is a complex interaction of many different systems-respiratory,
circulatory, neurological, digestive, and so on. Some of them can fail and create
both problems and opportunities we did not formerly have. One of the
opportunities we now have is that we can keep people alive who in an earlier
era would not have survived. And one of the problems we now have is also
that we can keep people alive who in an earlier era would not have survived.
Some of them are kept alive with such diminished capacity that we are not sure
that on balance it is what we ought to do. Indeed, often we have the capacity
to keep people alive who are sure themselves that it does them no benefit. That
one possibility transforms the relationship between physicians and patients.
Instead of patients hoping that medical intervention can do for them some part
of what they want, patients now confront the question, "How much of what
doctors can do do I want done?" That is a new kind of question, and it has
changed the distribution of decisional authority Some cases of physicians
wanting to do more than the patients want done have even lead to litigation.
An evolution of models of clinical decision making parallels this
transformation in the nature of health care. What I will say next is, as it must
be in such a context, something of a cartoon. But, like any good cartoon, it
captures a truth. In the olden days, meaning until relatively recently, medical
decisions were made paternalistically by doctors. Hence the familiar
expression, "doctor's orders." That's how it worked. The doctor decided, gave
orders, and patients followed them. If they did not, they were accused of failure
to be in compliance. It all had a militaristic gestalt. Also note the parallel with
traditional family structure where the authority (the father, the male) gives the
orders, which are then implemented by the woman (the wife, the nurse) for the
dependent (the vulnerable, the patient or child). There is an intriguing
isomorphism between these two traditional models.
How many find equally familiar the expression, "lawyer's orders"? That is
not so familiar. Yet, assuming your lawyer is competent, if you do not have
adequate regard for the advice of your lawyer, bad things can happen. You can
lose your property, respect, even your freedom. In the extreme case you can, in
the United States, lose even your life. Yet we do not speak of "lawyer's orders."
Lawyers just provide advice. There is something instructive in the
juxtaposition of these two different professions in their relationship to those
they serve.
Over the past three decades that paternalistic model of medical
decision-making gave way to a preferred model of autonomous
decision-making in which it was initially understood that physicians should
provide patients with advice, enabling the competent patient to make the
decision about what would then be done. The reasons for that change are
multiple. It was partly a reaction to the possible divergence between the
aspirations of the doctor and the aspirations of the patient. It is also related to
the civil rights movement, the emerging women's rights movement, more
aggressive consumerism, and other social phenomena. But physicians, in the
face of this pressure to respect the autonomous decisions of their patients,
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found it frustrating when their patients were not the idealized rational and
intellectually deft patients. They were often dysfunctional in any one of a
number of ways--perhaps racked with pain, incapacitated by terror, just
irrational, or perhaps in various other ways not capable of being the decision
makers. So there emerged a third phase in the evolution of medical
decision-making: shared decision-making in which the decisional judgment
of the physician was required as a supplement to the physician's medical
advice. As much decisional authority was still vested in the patient as the
patient was capable of handling-but not more than that. This model emerged
as the preferred model of medical decision-making, probably within the last
decade.
Then this hard won autonomy that the patient had in collaboration with the
physician started to become unraveled by the relatively sudden and powerful
emergence of third party .constraints upon decision-making. I refer to health
maintenance organizations, insurance companies, risk managers, and
managed care managers, all of whom brought to bear on the health care context
an independent voice saying, "We understand that the doctor and the patient
have agreed that this is how they want it to be, but on advice of our statisticians,
or accountants or lawyers, that is not what we will approve."
So, medical decision-making has gone through a complicated multi-layered
evolution. Now, in addition to constraints that are internal to health care, there
are also the constraints that are emerging from legally mandated or regulated
policies.
As all of this was happening, medical progress proceeded apace. I have
mentioned life sustaining treatment-the ability to keep a patient alive who
otherwise would not be alive by using such devices as renal dialysis machines,
respirators, and all the rest. We have genetic screening. We have the use of
human genome information making possible the analysis of human
functioning at the molecular level and allowing us to intervene in ways that
were unimagined and perhaps unimaginable a decade or two ago. In this era
of technologically aided reproduction we worry about the disposition of frozen
embryos, and we have post-menopausal pregnancy resulting from in vitro
fertilization. Organ transplantation is common. An ad shown locally on
television in the Cleveland market likens the human being with a failed vital
organ to an automobile that needs a replacement part.
All of these phenomena-which transform utterly our relationship to the
medical sciences-glamorous and dramatic as they are, pale into insignificance
by comparison with the cumulative impact of incremental improvement in the
quality of geriatric medicine, which is demographic dynamite. We can sustain
the lives of aging people remarkably well. There are 50,000 people in the United
States today over the age of 100 years. That is just the nose-cone of the
demographic missile. Right behind these elderly people are waves of
nonagenarians and octogenarians who are doing very well. The number of
50,000 will, in just a few years, double to 100,000. Given this, it is not possible
to saturate medical need. There comes a time when there are enough color
television sets in the country to satisfy all the interests that people have in color
television sets. They may want bigger or newer ones, but once there is one in
every room, more of them become more a burden than a benefit.
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Medical care does not have that characteristic. When you keep someone alive
by virtue of sophisticated medical intervention, you have produced a
continuing health care consumer. It is always simpler and cheaper to bury a
corpse than to have a surviving patient. As we continue to develop new medical
procedures and expand our capacity to treat the ailing and the elderly, we
greatly expand the range of what we are able to do and therefore the demand
increases and saturation of the demand seems not to be a possibility. That is
especially so if we define medical needs so broadly as to include the desire for
anything that can be medically helpful.
These issues are at the intersection of law and the most fundamental human
activities and values. What kinds of issues are we talking about? Birth,
reproduction, suffering, death-issues that we approach with anxiety, hope,
terror, trust, frustration, confidence, and sometimes despair. Surely these issues
require a larger perspective than that of law.
At this point, I will make a brief detour into legal education. Being a
non-lawyer in a law school has consequences. My course here is not primarily
about learning health related statutes or case law, nor is it about developing
legal skills, except in a broad sense. I told my students at the beginning that it
is not my role here to help them to learn to think like a lawyer. Enough other
people are doing that to them! My objective is to help them to learn to think
like a reflective, analytic, rigorous human being. That is a different matter. I
submit, however, that it is related to what is involved in being a genuinely good
lawyer. Paul Brest, the Dean at Stanford Law School, has been devoting
considerable effort lately to expressing some of his discontent with legal
education, which he submits is not producing good lawyers. 3 Its training and
focus are too narrow. It helps people to learn case law and to master the statutes,
but is not good at all at developing three specific values that he argues are
crucial to being an effective lawyer: common sense, creativity and good
judgment. He proposes substantial reformation of the curriculum designed
specifically to address these areas.
That is part of my objective, too. I see that as part of liberal education. If more
of this were infused into law schools it would enhance the quality of legal
training, just as it would in medical school. Let me illustrate with a specific
example.
I asked my students at the beginning of the semester to write a short paper
in which they did two things: First, describe some action they considered to
have been wrong, either their own or someone else's. Second, explain why it
was wrong. This, I learned, was an extremely difficult assignment for law
students because they did not know what cites were appropriate. They wanted
to know, and some of them verbalized this concern explicitly: "What

3

Mary Crystal Cage, Stanford Law School Experiments with a Course that Teaches
Students to Think Like Lawyers, CHRON. HIGHER EDuc., Sept. 13, 1996, at A16; Paul Brest,
The Responsibility of Law Schools: Educating Lawyers as Counselors and Problem Solvers, 58
LAW & CONTEMP.PROBS. 5 (1995); Paul Brest, Phs Ca Change,91 MicH. L. REV. 1945 (1993)
(Response to Judge Harry T. Edwards).
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authorities are we to cite?" I said, "How about the authority of your own
capacity for sophisticated moral reasoning?" The answer was, "But that would
be an opinion. We're not allowed to have opinions." Later we talked about what
goes on in the courts as they read the second and ninth circuit federal appeals
court opinions on physician assisted suicide.4 I raised the question, "Why do
you think these are called opinions?"
The point is that extra-legal judgment is important even in the context of law
school. Lawyers and law students need to understand that the important social
issues that confound us, including but not limited to issues in health care,
cannot be resolved simply by recourse to the law. The law itself is something
we evaluate in terms of broader concerns and more fundamental values even
than those reflected in the law. The law is a mechanism of social choice and also
a reflection of social choice. To maximize the law's value as a social enterprise,
we need to evaluate its operation both within and from outside of its internal
legal parameters.
The new possibilities in health care present new decisional challenges and
new realities. What do we want from health care? In an ideal world, what
would health care be like? We would like access to it. We would like it to be of
good quality and we would like it to be affordable. But access is ambiguous.
We have to ask, "Access for whom, and access to what?" The easy answer to
access for whom is access for everyone. It is a remarkable and shameful fact
about the United States that we, uniquely among the industrialized nations, do
not provide access for everyone. But the "Access to what?" question is harder.
Does this mean, for example, that anyone regardless of age or condition who
wants organ transplantation--say, a heart-lung transplant-should be entitled
to it even if the person has already had a few which have failed because of the
person's self-destructive lifestyle?
We have to address difficult questions of limitation. Central to the new reality
of health care is that it is just not possible to have access to everything for
everyone who might want it, plus quality with affordability. Most
commentators understand that it is comparatively easy to have any two of the
three. If you do not care what you spend you can have good access for
everybody at a high level of quality. But we do care what we spend. If we do
not mind the basic American approach of excluding fifteen percent of the
population from access to health care, then we can have good quality and
reasonable affordability. If we are unconcened about the quality then we can
have broad access and affordability.
Now, not just in the United States, but throughout the developed world,
people are trying to cope with these realities and the attendant tensions are of
a new kind. Health maintenance organizations and other structures of the
delivery of health care now focus on cost containment and outcomes research.
In the old days-and again when I talk about the old days, that means within

4
Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir.), cert.granted, 117 S.Ct. 36 (1996); Compassion
in Dying v. State of Wash., 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir.)(en banc), cert. granted,Washington v.
Gluckberg, 117 S. Ct. 37 (1996), consolidated and argued on January 8, 1997.
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my lifetime and most of yours-the relationship between a doctor and a patient
was a caring relationship that had continuity. You had your doctor, who had a
continuing relationship with you. Medicine was a calling, and patients'
interests were the highest value.
In these new days, the language in which health care is discussed is
completely different. One hears-and you can hear this eavesdropping in
medical environments and other places as well-the new vocabulary of
through-put rates, downsizing, mergers and acquisitions. It is the language of
corporate industry, with health care CEOs who have multi-million dollar
annual salaries, spending tens of millions of dollars on advertising, and
sending hundreds of millions of dollars out of the health care system as returns
to investors. Yet, tens of millions of Americans still go without any coverage
for health care.
In this changed environment of physician-patient autonomy, the doctor and
patient often must seek permission to proceed in accordance with their joint
decision. Sometimes, the doctor has to defend the patient against deprivations
imposed by the doctor's employer, not just the patient's insurer. With the
mergers and acquisitions, increasingly the insurance company is buying the
hospital and the hospital is employing the doctor. This often occurs through a
complicated, multi-layered network of corporations so that the ownership line
is elaborate. But, it is all one interrelated complex of organizations.
What is the consequence of this for the character of medical practice and of
medical care? I submit, and this is not a dazzling insight, that the changes in
the structure and financing of medical care in the last decade do not just change
the way it is paid for and delivered, they are changing what it is that is
delivered.
What is the proper role of the law in such matters? I will cite some examples
both of litigation and of legislation. First some cases. Scheer v. Entel Radiological
Association.5 Alan Scheer, a clinical radiologist, left the Georgetown University
Medical School and joined a practice group in Florida where he was providing
clinical treatment in a private corporation. Although he was not an equity
partner, he was a high ranking and well-paid employee. One day he was
summarily fired-simply told by an officer of cthe corporation, essentially,
"Clean out your desk. Don't come back tomorrow." There was never any
allegation of discontent with the quality of his clinical service.
Scheer sued the corporation which had been his employer. In the trial it came
out that the firing was strictly a business decision. The powers in that
corporation decided that Scheer was not the rainmaker they had hoped he
would be. He had declined to join the local country club and to do various other
things to help promote the image of the clinic. They wanted to replace him with
a younger and less expensive clinical radiologist. Much of the discussion in the
trial focused on his relationship with his patients, some of whom had shown

5

No. 86-14316-14 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Pinellas County Nov. 2, 1989), affd, 592 So. 2d 684
(Fla. Ct. App. 1992).
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up for appointments only to be told that Scheer was gone and that they had
been reassigned to another doctor.
These patients had no information about ownership, corporate structures,
or employer-employee relationships. Their position was, "I have a medical
need. I am a patient. He is my doctor. What do you mean, I am now the patient
of some stranger with whom I have no relationship? I am not the patient of
some corporate entity. I am the patient of a physician, a specific human being
with whom I have a relationship." But the clinic claimed that the patients were
theirs, and that they had the right to reassign patients to other physician
employees at their option.
So a question arose that was essentially new. If I am a physician and you are
my patient, what is the operational significance. of that fact? We have a sense
of what it means to say, "That is my car." I can give it away or sell it. I can do
with it as I please. We know what it means to say "That is my student." I have
certain responsibilities and certain entitlements. Similarly, if I say "That is my
son," I have certain entitlements and responsibilities. But what does it mean to
say "That is my patient?" What are the associated entitlements and
responsibilities on both sides? This question has not been adequately
addressed.
At the trial court there was a judgment in Scheer's favor of $1.85 million,
subsequently reduced on appeal to about a quarter of a million dollars. Central
to this case was what these business practices did in rending the fabric of the
relationship between doctors and patients.
In another Florida case, 6 a Dr. Cutler had a patient in the hospital who had
several problems including a suborbital fracture of the right eye. The care
manager-in a different state with a fax machine, a telephone, and some papers
on the desk-ordered the discharge of the patient. Dr. Cutler refused on the
grounds that in his medical judgment the patient was not ready to be
discharged. The company was Prucare, an insurer of employees of Eastern
Airlines for whom this patient had worked for decades. Prucare informed the
patient that further coverage was not authorized. Dr. Cutler was then dropped
from the roster of approved physicians. He sued the insurance company that
had cut him from its provider list. That case settled out of court with terms
undisclosed.
One more case: 7 In Kalamazoo, Michigan, a Dr. H. brought suit against a
medical corporation which had approached him when he was in private
practice and said, "We like your practice, We like your style. You're just the kind
of physician we want associated with our health care enterprises." They made
a deal with him according to which they would invest in his practice, which he
wanted to expand. They brought in a computerized information system, more
sophisticated office management, and some staff. He added some new clinical
specialities to the practice and remained the medical director. He was medically

6

No. 89-09164 CA 17 (Fla. Cir. Ct., Dade County).

7

No. A90-0098-CK (Mich. Cir. Ct., Kalamazoo County).
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sophisticated and talented, but was naive--culpably so-with respect to the
agreements that were crossing his desk. Dr. H. either did not have, or else did
not follow, good legal advice. He learned one day, to his complete surprise, that
he had become just an employee of the organization. He had built the practice.
It was his practice. He had many patients who saw him as their doctor. Like
Dr. Scheer, he was told one day, "You're finished. You're no longer an employee
of this corporation." They just threw him out. There, too, the patients said, "But
he's our doctor, not some corporation." That case also settled out of
court-another example of how the structures of financing and the
management imperative have resulted in a radical change in the nature of the
clinical transactions. These were not malpractice litigations. Doctors were the
plaintiffs.
What about the legislative side? One of the early major pieces of legislation
was Medicare's establishment of an end-stage renal disease program in the
United States. According to this program 8 the federal government provides
funding for the treatment of kidney disease. If you want federal funding, make
sure that is the disease you have, because it is the only one for which you have
an entitlement to treatment by virtue of your medical need. There are also state
laws about contracts regarding surrogate motherhood, legislation with respect
to health care proxies and do not resuscitate orders, and federal legislation that
bans a commercial market in transplantable kidneys. The recent
Kennedy-Kassebaum Bill,9 signed in August, provides certain constraints on
what insurers may do and exclude. A 1996 amendment to the Veterans Affairs
Bill prohibits "drive-through deliveries," that is, the practice of requiring
mothers who have just delivered a child to be out of the hospital within 24
hours after birth.1 0
There is also legislation, pending or enacted, in many states, and some
federal bills, having to do with gag rules. Some health maintenance
organizations have had the physicians who work in their employ sign
employment agreements which limit what the physicians can say to their
patients about various matters. Such matters include alternate modes of
treatment that might benefit the patient but are not offered by that health plan,
the structure of incentives which give the physician bonuses at the end of the
year for under-utilizing treatments as compared with statistical projections,
and comparative discussion of different health plans that might reflect badly
on the health maintenance organization. Many people have observed a kind of
irony in this attempt to limit free exchange of speech between physicians and
patients, precisely because patients, we have long been told, must confidently
rely upon and trust their physicians.

842 U.S.C.A. § 1395rr (1996) (End Stage Renal Disease Program).
9

Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-91,
110 Stat. 1936 (1996).
10 6 U.S.C. § 601 et al. (1996).
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If a physician is to be therapeutically effective, that physician must have
access to full disclosure by the patient. But how can the physician expect the
patient to be completely trusting in a climate in which what the physician can
say to the patient is constrained by business considerations imposed by the
employing organization? So the American Medical Association has come out,
guns ablaze, against gag rules or restrictive clauses in employment contracts
with physicians. State legislatures are also beginning to pick that up, just as
they did before Congress addressed the question of how much hospitalization
a woman should be entitled to following a normal delivery.
How should such issues be resolved? To what extent do we want to turn to
the law, through litigation or legislation, to resolve these various and diverse
problems? Let me cite one example. I mentioned the prohibition of a
commercial market in kidneys. In the early 1980s a physician in Virginia named
Barry Jacobs sought to go to third world countries, find relatively healthy, but
very poor people, and explain to them that their lives could be transformed for
the better if they would relinquish one kidney to be transplanted into an
affluent American. The recipient, by paying for the kidney, would be able to
jump the queue and have the transplant. Jacobs would ensure the quality
control and he would, of course, earn a fee for the transaction. The argument
was that everybody would benefit. The wealthy American would have the
organ he needed for his transplantation. It would be an economically
advantageous transaction for Jacobs' company The peasant, instead of facing
grinding poverty and limited life expectancy, would be lifted up out of poverty
by the provision of enough money to establish him in some kind of
self-sustaining way. To be sure, his health would be slightly diminished by
relinquishing one of his kidneys, but that would be more than compensated
for by the contervailing benefits of being freed from intractable and relentless
poverty.

The argument did not prevail. Federal legislation prohibits a commercial
market in transplantable organs. 11 No one said there can not be three people-a
recipient, a donor, and a physician-all of whom would benefit from such a
transaction. The argument failed because of much broader considerations
about what it says of a society which would address the problems of medical
need and poverty in such a way. It failed because of our desire not to create a
commercial market in body parts, but to think of the world of medical care as
different in important ways from the normal domains of commerce.
These are global considerations of societal values, of what kinds of
precedents seem to make sense and what kinds seem dangerous. At issue are
questions of liberty, individualism, responsibility, and community, and
therefore they are very much questions of the fundamental political structure
within which we operate. One can imagine a society, one can even see examples
of it, in which patient autonomy and individual choice are not respected.
Imagine a soldier in the Army, for example, who says "I would rather not have

lOrgan Procurement and Transplantation Act, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2343
(1984) (codified at 42 U.S.C.A. § 274e (West 1996)).
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first-aid for this minor wound because if you patch me up I may get sent back
to the front and I prefer to be a little uncomfortable back here where it is safer."
In a situation like that, patient consent is not at issue. One can imagine an entire
political environment in which medical decisions are imposed. In our
environment, informed consent is required because we respect individual
autonomy and we believe that people have a right not to have bodily intrusions
imposed on them which they do not themselves sanction. These deeply
political values underlie clinical transactions.
Are litigation and legislation the way to resolve such matters? At what level
of detail? What kinds of issues require and invite legal remedies when we talk
about problems in health care? These are extremely difficult questions.
Certainly the fact that fifteen percent of the American population lacks health
care coverage requires a legislative remedy. Consider these brief excerpts from
a wonderful and important book on this point. First, from the preface:
This is a book which will step on a great many toes, including those of
some physicians and of the large industries which derive their income
from the manufacture or distribution of products which directly affect
public health.
Then, from the book itself:
The Committee on the Costs of Medical Care showed conclusively that
the American people need insurance against the costs of medical care.
A hundred other studies, before and after that Committee have shown
the same need....
There has been enough of surveys and studies. The facts are at hand.
What is needed now is not further meditating over statistics but
hard-headed work to devise practical solutions.
Finally, from a hundred and fifty pages further in the book:
There will still be large problems to be solved and strong opposition
to overcome. Constant vigilance will be needed against obstructive
tactics and against the efforts of unfriendly interests to seize control.
The legislative progress of the National Health Bill must be watched
closely to see that it is not crippled by compromises.
The book, Health in Handcuffs, was written by John Kingsbury and published
in 1939.12 It ought to be reissued. That is depressing, but it is important to
understand that debate about our inadequate public response to health care
needs has gone on not merely for decades, but generations. Nothing short of a
large-scale legislative remedy can address the embarrassing and long-standing
lack of access in the United States.

12 JOHN A. KINGSBURY, HEALTH IN HANDcuFFs, introduction, 42,198 (1939).

1996-97]

IS LAW THE PRESCRIPTION?

In the Matter of Quinlin,13 the court finding was not a clinical decision but a
finding about where decisional authority should reside. The decision was that
the family should make the decision as a personal matter in consultation with
physicians and clergy as they saw fit, but that this was not the kind of clinical
decision that should be made by the court.
What do we get and what do we lose when we resort to the law in making
health care decisions? Let me refer now to the infamous Baby Doe Hotline
which in the early 1980s was set up by the federal government to protect
newborn infants who had birth defects from being under-treated by those who
were in a position to impose a clinical judgment that treatment was not
warranted. I will quote three paragraphs I wrote in 1991:
Curious about how the Baby Doe Hotline was working, I had called
it in April 1983. I was told that the line could only be used to report
cases of suspected abuse, but that if I left my name and number,
someone would return the call who could answer my questions.
Within minutes, a member of the HHS staff did return the call. Ilearned
that the hotline had received at that point about 500 calls. Most of them
were about tax questions, veteran's benefits, social security, the
national parks, and other matters unrelated to the purpose of the
hotline. A free line to Washington, it seems, has broad appeal.
Only a handful of calls reported complaints of the appropriate type,
and some of those were quickly found to be hoaxes. In four cases, the
Department was able to confirm that the caller was lodging a serious
complaint about a real infant. In one of those cases-but possibly just
one-a neonatal intensive care unit was disrupted by the sudden
arrival of a squad of federal marshals and local police. In the end,
nothing inappropriate was found to have been happening in respect
to the treatment of the infant. But the fact that the disruption occurred
at all quickly emphasized in nursery units across the land that
malpractice suits are not the only peril hanging over the heads of
neonatologists.
One mistreated infant would be one too many; preventing one such
abuse is an objective that must command respect. But one disrupted
hospital unit is also a lot, for it is enough to demonstrate the reality of
direct government involvement in particular patient care decisions,
even when there is complete agreement among family and medical
14
team members about what ought to be done.
So, the law is a crude instrument for making specific clinical decisions. What
are the alternatives? Market mechanisms can do some good, and have begun
to illuminate inefficiencies in the health care system and some practices which
13
14

1n re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647 (N.J.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
SAMUEL GoRovrrz, DRAWING THE LINE: LIFE, DEATH, AND ETHICAL CHOICES IN AN

AMERICAN HOSPITAL, 45 (1993).
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are contrary to patient interests. But market mechanisms always work to the
detriment of the most disadvantaged except insofar as those market
mechanisms are themselves constrained by an externally imposed
commitment to social justice.
Now, because I am a philosopher rather than a jurist or lawyer, I can end
with two related questions rather than an answer. Because I am a visitor, I can
then just leave town. They are hard and complex questions, but important ones.
I believe some good will have been done if I can induce you to take them
seriously and begin to ponder and discuss them. They are just this: (1) What
is the range of health related issues that it is appropriate to address through the
mechanisms of law? (2) For those that are better addressed in other ways, what
strategies are available for keeping them out of the courts and out of the
legislatures?
These are not questions within the law. They are questions about the law and
about its relationship to many of the most intimate and important dimensions
of our personal lives. Their scope ranges from the degree of autonomy that
families will enjoy to the allocation of social resources over the various different
good purposes that we value. Ultimately, they are questions about the extent
to which we will fashion a just, humane, and healthful society. The right doses
of law, properly applied, can do health care some substantial good. But, just as
a healthful life requires much more than just good medicine, curing what ails
health care in the United States today-and that, I submit, is a lot-will require
much more than just prudent legal intervention and the avoidance of
imprudent legal intervention. Helping decide what else is possible, and what
else is needed, is a challenge we should all accept as part of our responsibility
as potential patients, as family members, as taxpayers, and as citizens.

